Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Associate Professor, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Iran
2 M.A. Student in Business Administration, Noor Tooba Electronic Higher Education Institute, Iran.
Abstract
Background and Objective: The transition to a circular economy and the expansion of closed-loop supply chains have made recycled paper a strategic raw material in the paper industry. However, in reverse logistics and recycling chains, the quality of recycled materials is inherently uncertain, which affects production process stability, operational decisions, downtime and scrap costs, and market acceptance. In Iran as well, despite the economic and environmental inevitability of paper recycling, institutional and operational challenges have caused the quality of recycled inputs to remain variable and negotiable in many cases. Accordingly, this study aims to explain how “quality governance” is formed in Iran’s recycled paper supply chain, which boundary judgments and institutional assumptions reproduce the current quality situation, and, based on this understanding, what defensible reform implications and actionable recommendations can be proposed.
Materials and Methods: This research adopted a qualitative approach, and its analytical framework is based on Critical Systems Heuristics and its twelve boundary questions. The logic of Critical Systems Heuristics relies on a systematic comparison between the current state and the desired state, making it possible to render explicit and open to critique the boundary judgments related to objectives, decision-making authority, valid knowledge, and the legitimacy of decisions. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 20 experts and key actors in the recycled paper supply chain. Participants were purposively selected from the main links of the chain and included managers and specialists from factories that use recycled paper (especially those responsible for procurement, production, and quality control), collection/sorting and processing actors, intermediaries and wholesalers, and individuals familiar with standards, testing, and oversight mechanisms. The experts’ professional activities were located in the country’s main hubs connected to the recycling network and the paper industry, and interviews were conducted to capture diverse perspectives in Tehran and Karaj, Isfahan, the northern provinces, and Khuzestan. After transcription, interview texts were coded using the twelve boundary questions and reorganized across four dimensions—motivation, control, knowledge, and legitimacy; then, to increase transparency and traceability, the results were translated into institutional axes and corresponding reform packages.
Findings: The results showed that in the current state, the dominant goal of quality governance is largely focused on maintaining the flow of supply and transactions and ensuring short-term feedstock provision, while success criteria are defined mainly in economic and operational terms; therefore, quality is often reduced to the minimum level required for acceptance or continued production. In the control dimension, decision-making regarding acceptance/rejection, grading, and pricing is dispersed and multi-centered and, alongside some formal rules, remains significantly reliant on market conventions and case-by-case agreements. In addition, asymmetry in access to levers such as volume aggregation, market information, the ability to mix loads, access to large customers, and testing tools and results turns quality into a negotiable variable and reproduces quality fluctuations. In the knowledge dimension, although field experience plays a central role, the lack of integrated and reliable data and the absence of uniform procedures for sampling, testing, and producing defensible reports cause quality decisions and disputes to rely on informal information, limiting evidence-based dispute resolution. In the legitimacy dimension, weaknesses were observed in representation and accountability channels regarding quality claims and decisions; affected and cost-bearing groups do not necessarily have an effective ability to influence rules or follow up decisions, and as a result, the dominant logic tends toward a market-centered, transactional view.
Conclusion: This study indicates that single-link or purely technical interventions are insufficient for sustainable quality improvement, and that reforming quality governance must simultaneously strengthen shared rules, reliable data, aligned incentives, and accountability. Based on the findings, four proposed executive reform packages are presented: (1) “standards and testing infrastructure” to turn quality into a measurable and defensible criterion through minimum indicators, uniform sampling/testing, and periodic audits; (2) “transparency and data governance” to reduce information asymmetry through a load quality sheet, record-keeping, and standardized access to documentation; (3) “quality-based contracts and incentive alignment” through quality-dependent pricing and reward/penalty mechanisms for nonconformance; and (4) “regulation, accountability, and dispute resolution” through clarified responsibilities and test-based arbitration. The gradual and coordinated implementation of these packages can enhance input quality stability, reduce the costs of poor quality, and improve supply reliability across the chain.
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